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SOME RECENT CASES DELAYING THE
DIRECT EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES IN DUTCH LAW
Henry G. Schermers*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is meant as a comment on some recent Dutch cases
concerning the effect within the domestic law of the Netherlands of
the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 7a(i) of the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' and of
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 2 The cases were decided by the Centrale Raad van Beroep,
which is the Dutch supreme court in some fields of administrative law,
such as the law on civil servants and several laws on social security.
The cases are particularly interesting with respect to the notion of di-
rect effect.
Article 7a(i) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights laid down prohibitions on discrimination.
Recently, the Centrale Raad van Beroep has decided cases interpreting
the effect of these prohibitions on the internal law of the Netherlands.
The cases are particularly interesting because of their impact on
both international and Dutch law. For the first time, a State accepted
that restrictions on internal implementation, which arise out of consid-
erations not inherent in the treaty itself, will delay the law of the treaty
from having immediate direct effect, or prevent it from retroactive ap-
plication, in the internal law of that State. As an example of the im-
pact of such a practice, the local impact of these cases on the
Netherlands is great. Using factors external to the treaty to assess the
scope of direct effect has caused an ironic situation: Though the pur-
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1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 INT'L LEG. MAT. 360 (1967); also at Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 490 (1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976). INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION § I.A. 12.2.b. (Kapteyn, et al., eds. 1981-84)
[hereinafter 1.0.1.].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
INT'L LEG. MAT. 368 (1967); also at G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc.
A/6316, at 52 (1966)(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); I.O.I., supra note 1, at § I.A. 12.2.c.
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pose of the Dutch court's use of external factors was to mitigate the
constitutional mandate of direct effect and thus assuage the domestic
cost-impact of Article 26, the court's ultimate decision to apply the
treaty directly with limited retroactive effect to social security cases
could nevertheless cost the Dutch government an enormous sum of
money.
First, this article will make some necessary introductory comment
on judicial control in general, the priority of treaty law in the Nether-
lands, and the need for Dutch courts to interpret treaties and to assess
their direct effect within the domestic legal order. Second, the article
will explore the recent cases. Upon analysis, these cases reveal that
legal certainty - the predictability of the law - will suffer greatly if
the direct effect of a treaty article is made to depend upon the circum-
stances of each case. Had the court simply offered a particular inter-
pretation of the treaty concerned, based only on the treaty's language,
the cost-impact would have been no less and the value of legal cer-
tainty would have been preserved.
II. JUDICIAL CONTROL
In some States, the judiciary controls the constitutionality of legis-
lation. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the Consti-
tutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) may declare a law void
whenever it violates the Constitution.3 The underlying theory is that
the Constitution is supreme. No authority, not even the elected Par-
liament, should have the power to deviate from the Constitution. Af-
ter the experience that even a democratically elected parliament can
become undemocratic, the framers of the German Constitution
wanted to make sure that no deviation of the fundamental guarantees
of the Constitution would ever be possible. They considered that a
constitutional court of independent judges would be the safest guard-
ian of the Constitution.
In other States, such as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the courts have no power to leave aside or overrule
statutes adopted by Parliament. Parliament, as representative of the
People, is sovereign. It can autonomously decide what its powers are.
No other authority is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the
legislation it has adopted. Any power of appointed courts to overrule
the elected Parliament would be considered undemocratic.
3. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht, § 78,juncto Grundgesetz, Art. 93; English trans-
lation in VI CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Franz,
eds., 1988) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD].
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Traditionally, the Netherlands follow the same line of thinking as
the United Kingdom. The democratic machinery has always worked
well and there has never been any fear that Parliament would adopt
legislation contrary to the principles of the Dutch Constitution. Ac-
cordingly, Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution provides: "The con-
stitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed
by the courts."
In the Netherlands, however, there has been another trend. As a
small country with large overseas interests, the Netherlands, more
than other countries, depend on a faithful application of international
law throughout the world. Dutch lawyers have always been in the
forefront in advocating that national courts ought to apply the rules of
international law with priority over any domestic rules. Finally, in
1953, it was expressly laid down in the Dutch Constitution that laws
shall not be applicable if their application would be in conflict with
provisions of treaties or decisions of international organizations that
are binding on all persons.4 At the same time, the Constitution pro-
vided that all treaties need parliamentary approval before they may be
ratified.
5
Thus, the Dutch courts obtained the power to overrule Parliament,
not on the ground that the laws adopted by Parliament might infringe
the Constitution, but on the ground that they might infringe provi-
sions of treaties or resolutions of international organizations. When,
on August 31, 1954, the Netherlands adopted the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights,6 many traditionally constitutional provisions,
such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of assem-
bly, became treaty obligations. In fact, the courts now have the power
not to apply legislation when in a specific case they consider it a viola-
tion of human rights, provided these human rights are codified in an
international treaty. The human rights codified in the Dutch Constitu-
tion cannot be taken into account.
III. THE PRIORITY OF DUTCH TREATY LAW
Since the Dutch judiciary is not obligated to apply laws when to do
so would conflict with treaty provisions that bind all persons, interna-
tional treaties are more effective in the Netherlands than in most other
states. Article 7a(i) of the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant
4. Now Netherlands Constitution, Art. 94; English translation in X CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 3.
5. Id., at Art. 91.
6. 1.0.1., supra note 1, at § II.B.3.c; European Treaty Series No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
[Vol. 10:266
Direct Effect of Treaties
on Civil and Political Rights may serve as examples. Article 7a(i) of
the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights covenant provides:
The States Parties to the present Convention recognize the right of eve-
ryone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which
ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value with-
out distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work;
Article 26 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant reads:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, property, birth or other status.
For many States, these articles serve as a kind of general instruc-
tion for the legislator. One has to take account of them in order to
prevent international criticism, but the provisions play no important
role in the national legal order. By contrast, in the Netherlands, re-
cent case law, discussed below, demonstrates the decisive role of the
articles, and in particular of Article 26. Virtually all Dutch legislation
can be checked against it; no discriminating legal provision may be
applied by the courts.
IV. DIRECT EFFECT
The Dutch Constitution grants priority to international law only in
so far as it is incorporated in provisions of treaties that are binding on
all persons. The Dutch courts and most Dutch authors have inter-
preted the words "binding on all persons" as meaning provisions hav-
ing "direct effect." '7
The notion of "direct effect" is not entirely clear, and many au-
thors interpret it differently. The Court of Justice of the European
Communities uses the concept in the sense that national courts must
apply international provisions whenever these are so clear and detailed
that they can be applied without any need for further legislation. 8
This article uses the notion in the same sense mainly for practical rea-
sons. The concept of the Court of Justice can be used in practice with-
7. For a list of cases and for further details, see Schermers, The Effect of Treaties on Domestic
Law, 7 UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 112-16 (F.G. Ja-
cobs & S. Roberts, eds., 1987).
8. For the case law concerned, see H.G. SCHERMERS & D. WAELB3ROECK, JUDICIAL PRO-
TECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, §§ 124-33 (4th ed. 1987).
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out great difficulty, and it leads to good results. The words "binding
on all persons" should not be read as meaning applicable to every-
body, but rather as potentially applicable to anybody, or to anybody of
a particular category of persons - in the same way as laws are binding
on all persons, even though many laws are not applicable to every-
body. The restriction to provisions that are binding on all persons
obligates a Dutch court to rule upon the direct effect of international
treaty provisions before it can apply them.
In European Community law and usually also in general treaty
law, direct effect is seen as an absolute notion. A particular provision
has direct effect or it has not. At the request of members of the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Commission of the European Communities even
published a list of which articles of the EEC Treaty have direct effect
and which do not.9 In the European Community, it is the Court of
Justice that decides whether a particular provision has direct effect or
not. There is a considerable amount of case law on this question.'0
Under general international law, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice decided in 1928 that treaties do not create rights or du-
ties for individuals unless the treaty-making powers clearly decide
otherwise.'" Usually, treaty-making powers are reluctant to do so.
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) decided in
1962 "that the question whether the provisions of a treaty are directly
binding upon the subjects of the contracting States is - at any rate in
Dutch law - a question that can only be answered on the basis of
interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty.12
In the Second Defrenne Case,13 the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities was faced with a conflict between direct effect and
legal certainty. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty provides that during
the first four years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the Member
States must ensure and subsequently maintain that men and women
shall receive equal pay for equal work. The Member States did not
succeed in meeting this time limit and the Commission and the Coun-
cil of the European Communities took several decisions to extend the
period of four years. When Mrs. Defrenne complained of her lower
pay, the Court of Justice ruled that the extensions of the time limit
9. See 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 312/23) (1982).
10. See H.G. SCHERMERS & D. WAELBROEK, supra note 8, at §§ 243-63.
11. 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 15, at 17, Jurisdiciton of the Court of Danzig, 3 March 1928.
12. Netherlands Bosch Case, Hoge Raad 18 May 1962, 1965 NJ 115. 12 NTIR 1965, at 318-
22. Translation from BRINKHORST & H.G. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 225 (2d ed. 1977).
13. Second Defrenne Case (43/75), 8 Apr. 1976, 1976 ECR 455.
[Vol. 10:266
Direct Effect of Treaties
were contrary to the Treaty and therefore void, and that after four
years Article 119 had direct effect. However, until the date of the
Court's decision, the industries concerned could reasonably consider
that there was no direct effect, because of the decisions of the Commis-
ion and the Council. The Court of Justice then found the solution in
deciding that Article 119 had direct effect only from the date of the
judgment. It based this solution on the prevailing principle of legal
certainty.14
The following cases demonstrate that another Dutch supreme
court (the Centrale Raad van Beroep) recently gave a different inter-
pretation to the notion of direct effect. In its view, the question
whether a treaty provision has direct effect or not does not only de-
pend on the treaty, nor on the intention of the parties to the treaty, but
also on factual circumstances and on provisions of national law. Fur-
thermore, it does not consider "direct effect" to be absolute. It ruled
that treaty provisions may have direct effect under some circum-
stances and no direct effect under others.
V. THE CASES' 5
A. The Boesjes Case
t6
In 1982, the Dutch Parliament adopted a law according to which
all salaries of university staff were to be reduced by 1.85 percent. This
law applied also to the staffs of the academic hospitals. Salaries were
not reduced at other hospitals. The applicant claimed that the law
could not be applied, as it was in conflict with Article 7a(i) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 7.
The question arose whether Article 7a(i) had direct effect. Only then
could it be invoked by individuals.
The Centrale Raad van Beroep reasoned, inter alia, as follows: in
general, the substantive rights laid down in the Covenant have no di-
rect effect, but it goes too far to assume that Article 7a(i) of the Cove-
nant could never have any direct effect. Rather, in particular
circumstances, the Article could be suitable for direct application and
therefore subject the law to judicial control. Still, there is no general
answer to the question of when that might be the case. Suitability
depends, inter alia, on the character of the treaty provision and of its
14. Id. at 460.
15. I have tried to offer an accurate survey of the gist of the cases. The line of thought and
the arguments used are reproduced, but the translations are not literal.
16. Centrale Raad van Beroep, 3 July 1986, 1987 AB 229.
17. See supra note 1.
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infringement, as well as on the circumstances of the case. Also impor-
tant is whether the legislation may violate the essential elements of the
treaty-article or whether the violation is merely marginal.
A further consideration is that the case does not concern the con-
tinuation of an existing discrimination but the creation of a new one in
a field where previous equality existed. The creation of a new viola-
tion that is contrary to the provisions of the treaty will be more easily
covered by the direct effect of Article 7a(i), and therefore also by judi-
cial control, than a delay in the termination of a violation.
The social and legal context in which the treaty provision is to
operate should also be taken into account. It would be unacceptable
for Article 7a(i) to apply directly to the government as a whole. Yet,
the Article may have direct effect with respect to functions under one
and the same government authority, where the functions are covered
by the same labor conditions. Furthermore, it would go too far to
accept a direct effect of Article 7a(i) when the legislation concerns
only work of the same value and different functions are covered by the
same scale of salary. But the Article can be directly applied when, as
in the present case, for identical functions, the same remuneration was
paid in academic and in other hospitals before January 1, 1983, and
this equality is upset by the new law. Such a new law cannot be ap-
plied as being contrary to Article 7a(i) of the Covenant. As the Cen-
trale Raad van Beroep had insufficient information about the facts, it
ordered further investigation about the effects of the new legislation.
B. The X in A Case
Article 7(4) of the law on damages payments to those who were
prosecuted during the Second World War provides that payments to
women are normally terminated when they get married, while pay-
ments to men who marry are continued. Mrs. X in A claimed that
this provision was contrary to Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 1
8
For the interpretation in this case of a worldwide covenant, the
Centrale Raad van Beroep took account not only of the specific situa-
tion in the Netherlands, but also of rules adopted by the European
Community. It held that Article 26 of the Covenant was applicable in
the present case. 19 However, the Court held, this does not necessarily
mean that the Article has direct effect. The Centrale Raad van Beroep
confirmed its position, exhibited before in the Boesjes Case, that in sev-
18. Centrale Raad van Beroep, 14 May 1987, 1987 AB 543; see supra note 2.
19. For its reasoning, see the Six Women's Cases, infra notes 21-24.
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eral cases discrimination can be abolished only gradually. For the
abolishment of discrimination of the present kind, it considered rele-
vant that the European Community had adopted a directive on the
progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for
men and women in matters of social security, which provided that for
a number of social security issues, all discrimination had to be abol-
ished on December 23, 1984.20 According to the Centrale Raad van
Beroep, the date of December 23, 1984 should be seen as the most
appropriate moment from which Article 26 of the Covenant should be
considered directly effective. As the decision terminating the pay-
ments to Mrs. X was dated prior to December 23, 1984, it could not be
set aside as being contrary to Article 26.
C. The Six Women's Cases
On January 5, 1988, the Centrale Raad van Beroep reviewed six
almost identical decisions 21 involving cases brought by women whose
social security benefits had been reduced, although similar benefits of
men under the same conditions had remained unaffected. The women
invoked Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights. 22 In the X in A Case,23 the Centrale Raad van Beroep had
found December 23, 1984 as the date from which Article 26 should
have direct effect. In the present case, it did not set aside that deci-
sion, but it ruled that special circumstances (i.e., the purpose of the
Dutch law involved) justified another, earlier date.
The Centrale Raad van Beroep first had to decide whether Article
26 applied to cases such as the present ones. In previous case law, it
had consistently held that the Article did not apply to social security
legislation. In the present cases it overruled that view. It reasoned
that discrimination with respect to the civil and political rights con-
tained in the Covenant was prohibited by Article 2 of the Covenant.
Therefore, the prohibition of discrimination provided for in Article 26
must have a wider, general scope. Article 26 contains an independent
substantive right for everybody to be granted equal protection of the
law. That right also covers social security legislation. The Centrale
Raad van Beroep went on to say that this does not mean that all ine-
qualities in social security rules are of a discriminatory nature.
Rather, unequal treatment based on reasonable and objective grounds
20. Directive of 19 Dec. 1978, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L6/24) (1979).
21. Centrale Raad van Beroep, 5 Jan. 1988, 1981 AAW B126; 1982 AAW S122; 1982 AAW
S1141; 1983 AAW S22; 1983 AAW S90; and 1985 AAW S168.
22. See supra note 2.
23. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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can be justified. In the present case, however, no such justification
could be found.
With respect to the direct effect of Article 26 of the Covenant, the
Centrale Raad van Beroep referred to its prior considerations, that in
several situations discrimination can only gradually be abolished and
that the EEC directive of December 19, 197824 was important. After
the entry into force of this directive on December 23, 1984, direct ef-
fect could no longer be withheld to Article 26. The Court reasoned
further that in the present cases, it is of special importance that the
applicable rules are part of legislation which was introduced with the
purpose, inter alia, to terminate discrimination between men and wo-
men. As this legislation entered into force on January 1, 1980, the
Court decided that with respect to the substance covered by that legis-
lation, direct effect should be granted to Article 26 from January 1,
1980 forward.
VI. ANALYSIS
First, we are faced with the question of whether the interpretation
of the Covenants by the Dutch Centrale Raad van Beroep is purely a
matter of Dutch law or whether it may have any effect outside the
Netherlands. Of course, decisions of Dutch courts cannot be binding
upon any other States. Still, the effect of the interpretation is not lim-
ited to the Netherlands. As there is usually no possibility to obtain an
authentic interpretation of international treaties from an international
court, international treaty provisions are normally interpreted by the
national judiciaries whenever they apply them. In the opinion of the
Hoge Raad, such interpretation is a matter of international law and
should therefore be made according to the rules of international law.
25
One may submit that in the above mentioned cases, the Centrale Raad
van Beroep gave an interpretation of the Covenants, which, in its opin-
ion, should be seen as the proper interpretation applicable when Dutch
courts have to decide on the application with respect to the citizens of
other States. When the supreme court of a participating State inter-
prets a treaty provision in a particular way, that interpretation pro-
vides the manner in which that State applies the treaty. Other parties
to the treaty should object if they do not agree. In principle, the inter-
pretation by the supreme court must be generally applied by all organs
of the State concerned, without distinction as to whether it concerns
application within the domestic legal order or within other participat-
24. See supra note 20.
25. Bosch Case, 18 May 1962, NJ 1965, 115; 12 NTIR (1965) at 318-22.
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ing States. It would be unacceptable that the authorities of a State
would follow a particular interpretation for the application of treaty
provisions in their own country and a different interpretation for ap-
plication elsewhere.
Nonetheless, in the present cases the particular role of the Dutch
constitution should also be taken into account. In theory, it may be
correct that the direct effect of a treaty provision depends on the inter-
pretation of the treaty and is a question of international law. In prac-
tice, each State decides for itself whether or not it will apply a
particular treaty in its national legal order and whether, therefore, the
question of direct effect will arise at all. In many States, treaty provi-
sions such as those in the present cases cannot be invoked in court; in
the Netherlands they can be, if they are binding on all persons.
It seems justified to conclude that the Centrale Raad van Beroep
wanted mainly to mitigate the effect of the Dutch constitution rather
than to offer a particular interpretation of the Covenants. In a situa-
tion where some States directly apply the treaty provisions and others
do not, it decided to take a particular inbetween position - an in-
between position close to a full application, but with some restrictions
in time.
The idea that these restrictions could depend on factors other than
those inherent in the treaties themselves is a new one in international
law as well as in Dutch constitutional law, and seems worth mention-
ing in this special volume dedicated to a great international lawyer.
Whether the idea is a fortunate one is another matter. The direct ef-
fect of international treaties becomes very complicated if it also de-
pends on all kinds of circumstances outside the treaty itself. Legal
certainty - the predictability of the law - is an important value. It
will greatly suffer if one cannot be sure that treaty articles which have
been accepted as directly applicable in some cases will be so in other
cases.
As to the substance of the cases, the Six Women's Cases are of
particular importance to the Netherlands. So far, it was generally un-
derstood in the Netherlands that the Covenants did not directly apply
to social security. The holding of the Centrale Raad van Beroep that
Article 26 may be invoked in social security cases may lead to a large
number of claims and could obligate the Government to pay an
amount equivalent to several billions of U.S. dollars to women whose
social security rights have been restricted. One of the Dutch cabinet
ministers considered the decisions so damaging that he proposed to
withdraw from the Covenant and to re-enter with a reservation as to
Article 26. This suggestion, however, met with general opposition.
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The Netherlands will remain a party to the Covenants and Article 26
will continue to have an enormous impact in Dutch society.
